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Comments
DEFINING A RULE 23(b)(2) CLASS:
AN EXPOSITORY ANALYSIS
INT ODUCTION
In the summer of 1973 Cairo, Illinois was boiling with racial con-
flict. Since the early 1960's, black citizens of Cairo, together with a
small number of white persons on their behalf, had been actively
seeking equality of opportunity and treatment. Apparent failure
resulted in an economic boycott of city merchants who allegedly en-
gaged in racial discrimination. Tension and antagonism among the
white citizens and officials of Cairo rose, eventually arrests were
made, and the criminal justice system became the center of contro-
versy.
On October 17, 1973 certain black and white residents of Cairo,
having brought a class action, argued in front of the United States
Supreme Court that the defendants, in the administration of crim-
inal justice in the county, selectively discriminated against the
plaintiffs and members of their class.' This discrimination, plain-
tiffs argued, effectively deprived the class of their rights under the
First, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The con-
troversy, however, was never resolved by the Court since the named
1. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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plaintiffs had not shown a "personal stake in the outcome" and the
proffered class definition was inadequate.2  Thus, a conflict which
had been brewing for over ten years was left untouched by the ju-
diciary.
The focus of this article is on the Court's latter reason for deny-
ing the class action. At first glance the importance of the issue may
tend to be minimized since the Court submits no rationale for their
conclusion other than the definition was "ambiguous and contra-
dictory".3 It should not, however, be overlooked for a number of
reasons. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has finally specified out-
right that an adequate class definition is a prerequisite to the in-
vocation of federal jurisdiction in a class action suit. Second, by
implication, the Court has endorsed a restrictive view tending to
deny the class action when a questionable definition is proffered.
Third, the Court has joined a large number of lower courts in pro-
moting a general confusion as to the procedure involved in deter-
mining the adequacy of a 23(b) (2) class definition. This article
will analyze prior case law and developing theories in order to place
O'Shea v. Littleton, and possible future developments into their
proper perspective.
The purposes for limiting the scope to a discussion of 23(b) (2)
class definitions are two-fold. First, the discussion will expose the
reader to the fact that special problems are raised concerning the
class definition issue in 23(b) (2) actions which are not raised in
other class actions. Second, it is apparent that in light of recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting the usefulness of Rule 23 (b)
2. The class was defined as,
[A]ll those who on account of their race or creed and because of
their exercise of First Amendment rights, have in the past and con-
tinue to be subjected to the unconstitutional and selectively dis-
criminatory enforcement and administration of criminal justice in
Alexander County.
Id. at 491.
3. The Court's entire discussion of the issue was relegated to one foot-
note, and the issue was not a controlling factor in the Court's decision to
dismiss the complaint. Id. at 494 n.3.
After reading the class definition, and in light of the factual circumstances
of the case, the reader may want to analyze the Court's conclusion. What
the Court probably meant by terming the definition "ambiguous" was that
it would be impossible to distinguish those individuals discriminated against
on account of their race or creed and because of their exercise of First
Amendment rights, from those who were legally sentenced. In other words,
individual class members were incapable of definite identification.
(3),4 the prime, if not sole importance of Rule 23 has become sub-
section (b) (2). In some instances, the class definition issue now
threatens the usefulness of Rule 23 (b) (2) simply because of vague
and confusing statements like those found in O'Shea.5
THE CLASS MUST BE ADEQUATELY DEFINED
It is generally recognized that, in addition to the four require-
ments specified in Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure6 and those of Rule 23(b), 7 there is an essential prerequisite
to any Rule 23 class action that a class must exist and be adequately
defined.8 In some cases only a "general comment" is required at
the complaint stage subject to possible amendment as the litigation
proceeds, 9 while in other cases the complete definition must be in-
cluded in the complaint.'0 Most courts seem to agree that if there
is no attempt to define a class," or the definition is "too broad",'12
or "inconsistent", 13 or "vague",14 it is inadequate. Since a class is
composed of persons who can be categorized according to the simi-
larity of their factual and legal circumstances, 15 the definition
4. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Zahn v. International Pa-
per Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 214(1974); See also Comment, Closing the Courthouse Door: The Aftermath
of Snyder v. Harris, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1011 (1974).
5. See note 3, supra.
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a).
7. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
8. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 23.04 at 23-251 (2d
ed. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as MooRE]; 7 C. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civm § 1760 at 579 (1972) [hereinafter referred
to as WRIGHT & MILLER]. See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Fielder v. Board of Education of Sch. Dist. of Winnebago,
Neb., 346 F. Supp. 722, 727 (D. Neb. 1972) ("The complaint does not define
the purported class. This in itself may be a sufficient infirmity to cause
rejection of the request for a class action."); Williams v. Page, 60 F.R.D.
29 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
9. A "general comment" would require merely an attempt to define the
class in general terms. Jackson v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 338 F. Supp.
882, 886 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
10. See, e.g., Taylor v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 60 CCH LAB. L.
REP. 9268 (N.D.Ala. 1969).
11. Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886, 887 (E.D. Penn. 1970). However,
some courts have been satisfied with merely making their own inference
from the facts stated in the complaint. See, e.g., Saddler v. Winstead, 332
F. Supp. 130, 136 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
12. See, e.g., Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
13. Seee.g., Hardy v. United States Steel Corporation, 289 F. Supp. 200
(N.D. Ala. 1967).
14. See, e.g., Chaffee v. Johnson, 229 F. Supp. (S.D. Miss. 1964).
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (4th ed. 1951), defines "class" as, "[t]he
order or rank according to which persons or things are arranged or as-
sorted." See also WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760 at 579.
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should include a statement of basic facts, as opposed to a mere rep-
etition of the language of Rule 23.16
A class definition is required out of necessity because of the
many complexities inherent in class action suits, foremost of which
is the scope of the judgment. It is the court's job to determine
whether the controversy extends beyond the named representative
parties, and if so, to issue a judgment which will include "those
whom the court finds to be members of the class. ' T Since the
judgment has a res judicata effect in relation to the class, as defined
and described by the court, whether favorable or not,'8 the con-
cern of the court is in determining who the litigants are in order
to satisfy the requirements of due process.' 9 As the named repre-
sentatives often plead and prove facts relevant to their own circum-
stances, they must, as advocates, allege satisfactorily that the same
controversy extends beyond the named parties, and describe to
whom it extends.20
An adequate class definition probably has the greatest value in
connection with Rule 23(a). "Present throughout all four of the
prerequisites in Rule 23(a) is the preliminary problem of defining
the class."'2 ' If there is no class definition, or one which fails to
establish class boundaries, a court cannot estimate the number of
class members in order to determine whether joinder is impracti-
cable.22 In addition to the scope of the class, the definition must in-
clude factual references to an alleged common question of law or
fact,23 an allegation that the claims or defenses of the representa-
16. Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1969). Not all
courts, however, have so required. See, e.g., Educational Equality League
v. Tate, 333 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D. Penn. 1971).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (3).
18. Id. "[B]y today's order to enlarge the class we merely enlarge the
res judicata effects of whatever decision we may reach ... " Hicks v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 197 (E.D. La. 1968).
19. See Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
20. See Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1970);
Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (D.C. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 637
(5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
21. Donelan, Prerequisite to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C.
IND. AND COm. L. REv. 527, 529 (1969).
22. See, e.g., Williams v. Wohigemuth, 366 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Penn.
1973).
23. See Dunn v. New York State Department of Labor, 60 F.R.D. 10
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
tives are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, 24 and an al-
legation that the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. 25
Some courts have so focused on the requirements of 23 (a) that, if
they are satisfied, the action is simply certified as a class action
without determining the adequacy of the class definition. 20 Where
the adequacy (or inadequacy) of the class definition is obvious, or
where the purported class action must fail anyway under 23 (a), the
result of this procedure differs little with that of courts which con-
sider the adequacy of the class definition as a point of standard
procedure.27 Where, however, there is a questionable definition,
which otherwise would seem to satisfy Rule 23 (a), courts taking
this view would probably be comparatively lenient in accepting
the class as defined.28
Most courts take the view that the adequacy of the class defini-
tion is a separate determination from that of 23(a). 29 Although,
as previously mentioned, consideration of 23(a) requires an ade-
quate and clear class definition, there is nothing in 23 (a) which sug-
gests that the four requirements are the sole basis for determining
the adequacy of the class definition. In fact, a close reading of
Rule 23 (a) will lend support to a conclusion that the rule assumes
the existence of a defined class prior to any Rule 23 application. 0
A prerequisite to most procedural questions under Rule 23 is an
adequate class definition. It is essential in connection with the
notice requirement under Rule 23(c) (2), discretionary notice un-
der 23(d) (2), and dismissal or compromise of the action under
23(e), since all require means by which members of the class can
24. As applied to the class definition issue, the question is basically
whether the representative parties are included in the class they have de-
fined. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); The purpose for the
requirement is to "ferret out officious intermeddlers." Vernon J. Rochler
& Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335, 338 n.4 (D. Minn. 1971).
See also Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 461, 466 (1971).
25. See Charvis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
26. WaGcarr & MLLER § 1760 at 580.
27. Compare Ritacco v. Norwin School District, 361 F. Supp. 930, 931
(W.D. Penn. 1973), with Western Farmers Electric Cooperative v. Sangamo
Electric Co., 6 FED. RuLEs SERv. 2d 23a.11, case 1 (E.D. Penn. 1962).
28. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 54
F.R.D. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
29. See Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc. of Milwaukee, Wis., 56 F.R.D.
104, 105 (E.D. Wisc. 1972); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245, 248 (D. Minn.
1971); Weissman v. MCA Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 261 (D. Del. 1968).
30. Rule 23 (a) reads:
One or more members of a class may sue . . . (1) the class is so
numerous . . (2) . . . questions. .. common to the class, (3) . ..
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) . . . protect
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be identified and contacted.31 If the court must determine whether
to divide the class into subclasses pursuant to 23(c) (4) ,32 or deter-
mine the scope of discovery, 33 it must know at least the general
bounds of the class.
Procedural variances between a 23(b) (2) and 23(b) (3) action
have resulted in different requirements for an adequate class def-
inition. Unlike Rule 23(b) (3), a 23(b) (2) action does not require
notice to each member, 34 nor are class members given an opportu-
nity to "opt out".35 Since the plaintiff seeks equitable relief, each
member need not be identified to determine whether the claim
justifies invoking federal jurisdiction,36 and there need not be con-
cern with the problem of proving damages.37 A judgment in a
(b) (2) class action describes the members of the class, while a judg-
ment in a (b) (3) action specifies the individual members who have
been identified and describes the others. 38 Recently, the Court in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin39 suggested:
The procedure involved in applying for prospective injunctive relief
is relatively simple and inexpensive, social and economic reforms
may be implemented and an end put to illegal practices with far
more benefit to the community than that derived from [a 23 (b) (3)
action]."
Thus, while a (b) (3) class definition must be "precise" to allow
satisfaction of the various procedural requirements, 40 the trial
the interests of the class. (emphasis added).
Furthermore, Rule 23 (a) does not take into consideration such factors as
the scope of discovery, the scope of the judgment, notice, dismissal or com-
promise. See text accompanying notes 31-33, infra.
31. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760 at 583-84.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2). However, Rule 23 (d) gives the trial court
authority, at its discretion, to require notice in a 23 (b) (2) action. See Clark
v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (E.D. La. 1969), where
the court required notice in a (b) (2) action on due process grounds.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (3).
36. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), which ap-
plies only to (b) (3) actions.
37. See Comment, Proof of Damages, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1049 (1974).
38. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105 (1966). A "description"
would seemingly require a less accurate definition than a "specification".
Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1226
(1966).
39. 479 F.2d 1005, 1020 (2d Cir. 1973) aff'd, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
40. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
judge is free to exercise a much greater degree of discretion in de-
termining whether a (b) (2) class definition is acceptable.41
THE NEED FOR DIscRETIoN AND THE SEARCH FOR UNIFoRm STANDARDS
Having noted that a trial judge is afforded a greater degree of
discretion in determining the adequacy of a (b) (2) class definition,
the questions to be answered are: Why and how? The preceding
section has explained why procedurally. In addition, a greater de-
gree of discretion is required due to the unique nature of a (b) (2)
class action. The much quoted statement of the Advisory Com-
mittee to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 23 reflects the Committee's
recognition that often a 23 (b) (2) action is brought on behalf of a
class which cannot be precisely defined;
Illustrative [of 23 (b) (2) actions] are various actions in the civil
rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlaw-
fully against a class usually one whose members are incapable of
specific enumeration.4 2
For example, a class of school children affected by a segregationist
policy is constantly changing. The trial judge is faced with the
problem of issuing a decree which will include all those to whom
the conduct extends. Such a difficult task can only be accom-
plished if the trial judge is given sufficient discretion to, for ex-
ample, accept a tentative class definition subject to re-definition
prior to issuance of the judgment.43 A similar exercise of dis-
cretion would be difficult in a (b) (3) action where the class should
be adequately defined in the complaint.4 4
41. Of course, if the trial judge requires discretionary notice, or there
are questions as to the scope of discovery, or one of settlement, a (b) (2)
class definition may also be required to be "precise". See McAdory v. Sci-
entific Research Instruments, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Md. 1973);
Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899, 904 n.3 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
42. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
43. Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv.
629, 649 (1965):
A decree which attempts to define the changing class once and for
all is likely to be either too narrow to be useful to latecomers to
the class or else too broad and vague to respect properly defend-
ant's right to a well-defined order.
Accord, Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972). But see
Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); Heckart
v. Pate, 52 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
44. Procedural requirements, such as mandatory notice to all class mem-
bers, would so require. Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir.
1972). See text accompanying notes 34-41, supra. This does not mean that
the plaintiffs' right to maintain a class action cannot be conditional under
23 (b) (3). See, e.g., Taylor v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 60 CCH LAB.
L. REP. f 9268 (N.D. Ala. 1969), where plaintiffs' right to maintain a class
action was conditioned upon the filing of an amended complaint precisely
defining the class, and the filing of a list of class members with the court.
[VOL. 12: 150, 1974] Comments
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In order to provide uniform standards by which to measure the
adequacy of a 23(b) (2) class definition, courts have developed two
minimum requirements: The definition must meet certain mini-
mum standards of definitiveness 45 and the class must be defined
by the actions which a defendant has taken toward the class.46 It
is clear, however, that these two requirements only serve to add
to the overall confusion surrounding class definitions.47 Some
courts have entirely neglected these two requirements, 48 while
others have tightened the requirement of definitiveness to such an
extent that class action status will be denied when a questionable
definition (which would otherwise satisfy a minimum standard of
definitiveness) is proffered.4 9 A third category of decisions have
taken a pragmatic approach to the issue by emphasizing the sec-
ond requirement.50
A MINIium_ STANDARD OF DEFINITIVENESS
A 23(b) (2) class definition must satisfy a minimum standard of
definitiveness, which was first described in Chaffee v. Johnson,51
where the court stated, "[t]he members of a class must be capable
of definite identification as being either in or out of it. ' 52 The re-
quirement reflects concern with all the procedural questions pre-
viously discussed;5 3 thus it is preferable to satisfy the standard at
an early stage in the action.5 4 Depending upon what procedural
questions must be satisfied, however, it is not essential that the
45. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760 at 581-583.
46. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1365-1367 (1st Cir. 1972).
47. See Fitzgerald, When Is a Class a Class?, 28 Bus. LAWYER 95, 97-
101 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Rumler v. Board of School Trustees for Lexington County
Dist. No. 1 Schools, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971).
49. See, e.g., Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 398 U.S. 922 (1970).
50. E.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972).
51. 229 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. den., 384 U.S. 956 (1966).
52. Id. at 448. The court held that a class defined as "all persons who
are workers for the end of discrimination and segregation in Mississippi"
was inadequate because it depended upon the state of mind of a particular
individual, making it impossible to determine class membership. Id. See
text accompanying notes 71-75, infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 17-33, supra.
54. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760 at 583.
standard be complied with until after the merits of the case have
been adjudicated. 55
What is actually meant by "capable of definite identification"
has been the source of much conflict. One view seems to reflect a
rather strict interpretation of the phrase;
* . .the requirement that there be a class will not be deemed satis-
fied unless the description of it is sufficiently definite so that it is
administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a par-
ticular individual is a member.56 (emphasis added)
This interpretation is consistent with the requirements for a 23 (b)
(3) class definition,57 but seems to be inconsistent with the unique
nature of a 23 (b) (2) class since it is "usually one whose members
are incapable of specific enumeration."' 8
Nevertheless, a number of courts have subscribed to the "strict
interpretation" approach, and have consequently issued rather con-
troversial opinions. By implication, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
O'Shea v. Litteton, has recently subscribed to this view."0 This
is further supported by the Court's dismissal of the appeal in Lo-
pez-Tijerina v. Henry,60 the leading case espousing the "strict in-
terpretation" approach.
In Lopez-Tijerina, the plaintiffs purported to represent a class de-
fined as those persons having Spanish surnames, Mexican, Indian,
and Spanish ancestry, and who speak Spanish as a primary or ma-
terial language. All three characteristics were rejected by the
court stating, "their definition of the class is still too vague to be
meaningful", 61 because none of the definitions were capable of
identifying class members. "Spanish surnames" was inadequate
because,
[t]here are many people in New Mexico who, because of their mar-
riage or the marriage of their ancesters, have Spanish surnames,
who are not Spanish Americans. Similarly, there are many people
of Spanish or Mexican extraction who, for the same reason, do not
have Spanish surnames.62
55. If the only concern is with constructing a viable decree the standard
of definitiveness can be complied with after the merits have been adjudi-
cated. Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972). However,
if there are Rule 23 (a) questions, discretionary notice requirement, ques-
tions as to the scope of discovery, sub-dividing the class, or settlement un-
der 23 (e), the standard should be satisfied at the commencement of the
action. See WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760 at 583-584.
56. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760 at 581.
57. See text accompanying notes 34-41, supra.
58. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
59. See note 3, supra.
60. 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1971), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 922 (1970).
61. Id. at 276.
62. Id.
[VOL. 12: 150, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Likewise, it was impossible, according to the court, to determine
what constitutes Mexican, Spanish, and Indian ancestry since
mixed ancestry is quite common,68 and it was impossible to deter-
mine whether Spanish or English was a primary language because
many people in the state were bi-lingual. 64
Where Lopez-Tijerina would require a definition from which
each member can be specifically identified, courts subscribing to
a "liberal interpretation" would require a definition from which
a membership can be objectively described at the time of judg-
ment.0 5 The "liberal interpretation" merely requires that the class
be described by identifiable group characteristics, even though in-
dividual class members may be incapable of specific enumeration.6
Prior to O'Shea v. Littleton,67 the trend was to liberally interpret
the minimum standard of definitiveness outlined in Chaffee v. John-
son. The precise holding in Lopez-Tijerina has been subject to
criticism,6 8 and "persons with Spanish surnames" has subsequently
become an acceptable class description. 69 Professor Moore ex-
pressed the policy that, "[i] n actions brought to vindicate civil rights
63. Id. at 277.
64. Id.
65. Illustrative of the "liberal interpretation" is Carpenter v. Davis, 424
F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1970), where plaintiffs purported to represent a class de-
fined as all those who wrote for, published, sold, or distributed the newspa-
per or who wish to do so in the future. The newspaper, however, was
an "underground publication" distributed near college campuses, and the
names of writers and distributors were unknown. The court pointed out
that "[i] t is not necessary that the members of the class be so clearly identi-
fied that any member can be presently ascertained", and went on to certify
the class action. Id. at 260. See also Broughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp.
260, 267 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
66. In each of these cases [cited by plaintiff] the allowed class was
both large and to a certain extent indefinite and incapable of spe-
cific enumeration. However, in each of these cases it was perfectly
clear what the membership of the class was ..
Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 276(8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). See also Bledsoe, Moot-
ness and Standing in Class Actions, I FLORmA STATE U.L. REv. 430, 442
(1973).
67. See text accompanying notes 1-3, supra.
68. Lopez-Tijerina v. Henry, 398 U.S. 922 (Douglas dissenting opinion);
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 607-
608 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
69. E.g., Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M.
1972); United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971); Gutierez
v. Quinn & Co., 55 F.R.D. 395 (D.N.M. 1972); Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp.
930 (D. Mass. 1971), affd in part reversed in part, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.
1972).
the courts have taken a rather relaxed view of the necessity for
precise identifiability of the members of a class.170 Whether this
trend will continue is speculative.
TmEE IssuEs RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH A
Mnm/IUm STANDARD OF DEFINITIVENESS
Three issues arise under either standard of definitiveness. First,
where inclusion in the class depends upon the state of mind of the
purported class members, the courts cannot objectively identify the
membership. Second, when there is an identifiable group which is
heterogeneous, the courts are faced with the problem of describing
which segment of the group is to be included in the class. Third,
when the definition includes persons who, allegedly, will be injured
in the future, an additional test must be utilized to determine the
class boundaries.
1. State of Mind
As previously mentioned, the class definition in Chaffee v. John-
son was inadequate because it depended upon the state of mind of
individual purported members of the class. 71 Where the class is
defined entirely by the members' state of mind most courts, re-
gardless of the various standards of definitiveness, would reject the
class definition because there would be no apparent characteristics
by which a court could objectively distinguish the class bound-
aries.72
However, where there are any objective characteristics from
which a class can be ascertained, the state of mind description us-
ually will not defeat class certification. 73 One such objective char-
acteristic can be the conduct of the defendant. The class action,
therefore, will not fail if the state of mind description is merely an
intent to do some lawful act in the future, which will bring the pur-
70. MooRE, 23.04 at 20 (Supp. 1974).
71. See note 52, supra. "State of mind" is the familiar conceut wherein
the class is defined by the intent, knowledge, intelligence, or belief, etc.,
of its members. Thus, "state of mind" is strictly a subjective description.
Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (D. Del. 1971), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 405 U.S. 971 (1972).
72. DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1970); Barrett v. Kun-
zig, 331 F. Supp. 266 (M.D. Tenn. 1971); Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383
(E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
923 (1971).
73. Compare Broughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260 (N.D. Ala. 1969),
and, Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968), accepting the class
definition, with American Servicemen's Union v. Mitchel, 54 F.R.D. 14
(D.D.C. 1972) rejecting the class definition.
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ported class members in contact with an established discriminatory
policy.7 4 But, even then, if the alleged discriminatory policy de-
pends upon defendant's state of mind, the definition will be in-
adequate.75
2. Heterogeneous Group
Closely related to the previous issue discussed is the problem
arising where the representatives bring the action to protect the
constitutional rights of an identifiable group, of which a faction
are either indifferent to, or opposed to protection of their rights.
Since those in opposition are not technically members of the class, 76
some courts have approached the issue in terms of whether the
class definition has sufficiently identified the supportive faction.77
Of course, since inclusion would depend entirely upon the state of
mind of group members it would be rather difficult to satisfy the
minimum standards of definitiveness. 78
Such being the case, most courts seem to have taken a liberal
approach to the issue, especially where important constitutional
rights are involved.7 9 If possible, the courts will deal with the
74. See, e.g., Afro American Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 366 F. Supp.
1095 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Cypress v. Newport News General and Nonsectarian
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 n.9 (4th Cir. 1967).
75. E.g., Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383, 1388-1389 (E.D. Mo. 1969), af'd,
428 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
76. Carroll v. Associated Musicians of Greater New York, 206 F. Supp.
462, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 316 F.2d 574 (2nd Cir. 1963).
77. Carroll v. Associated Musicians of Greater New York, illustrative of
the approach, was an action by orchestra leaders to enjoin unions from col-
lecting certain taxes, surcharges, and welfare plan payments. The class was
basically defined as all those members of Local 802 who were similarly
situated. There were many members of Local 802, however, who did not
object to the union impositions and thus could not be considered members
of the class plaintiffs purported to represent. The court denied class action
status because,
'... identification [of class members] would not be possible in a
case, such as this, of fluid factional groups in a labor union.'
206 F. Supp. at 471, citing Giordano v. Radio Corp. of America, 183 F.2d
558, 560-61 (3rd Cir. 1950). See also Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361
F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Penn. 1973); Suchem Inc. v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co.,
52 F.R.D. 348 (D.P.R. 1971); Neal v. Systems Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d
722 (8th Cir. 1965).
78. See cases cited note 77, supra.
79. The possibility that some might not, at this time, wish to exercise
their right to freedom of speech does not preclude a class action.
Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 808 (E.D.N.Y.), reversed on other
situation by establishing subclasses;80 if that is not possible, by
merely ignoring the differences. 81 This approach is more practical
in light of the main purpose for Rule 23(b)(2)-to facilitate the
bringing of class actions to protect the constitutional rights of a
large segment of the population.8 2
3. Persons To Be Injured In the Future
Many definitions will describe a class consisting of, in part, per-
sons who are threatened by defendant's allegedly unlawful con-
duct.8 3 The usual purpose for including prospective injured par-
ties is to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 (a) .84
However, the definition must still satisfy the minimum standard
of definitiveness. A court can only identify future membership by
focusing on the defendant's conduct to determine generally who
will be affected in the future. Thus, in a case where plaintiff al-
leged that defendant employer had a policy of discrimination to-
ward women, and the class was defined as those women who will
seek employment with defendant in the future, the test was
whether defendant's acts of discrimination were continuing so as to,
in time, affect future women applicants.8,
Where defendant's conduct is obviously continuing most courts
would include in the class definition future persons affected, pro-
vided those persons can be described.8 6 And, if the conduct cannot
continue courts would be inclined not to accept a definition which
includes future injured parties.8 7 Where, however, it is question-
grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D.
122, 125 (W.D. Va. 1970), where, even though all purported members of the
class signed affidavits disclaiming any authority for plaintiffs to commence
the suit, the court decided that, because of the important constitutional
rights involved, the class action was maintainable.
80. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968).
81. See, e.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 808 (E.D.N.Y.), re-
versed on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971).
82. WRIGHT & MILER § 1775 at 24. If the Carroll approach, see note 77
supra, is carried to its extreme a class action dealing with highly controver-
sial constitutional rights would be a rarity.
83. Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing in Class Actions, 1 FLORMA STATE U.
L. REv. 430, 442 (1973).
84. E.g., Afro American Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 366 F. Supp. 1095
(N.D. Ohio 1973); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel and Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
85. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
86. See, e.g., Hairston v. Hutzler, 334 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Penn. 1971),
affd, 468 F.2d 621 (3rd Cir. 1972).
87. See Gerstle v. Continental Airlines Inc., 50 F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Colo.
1970), where the employer eliminated the discriminatory rule before com-
mencement of the suit, and so no case or controversy could exist as to "pres-
ent and future employees".
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able as to whether the harm is continuing, or to whom the harm
will extend, confusing opinions have resulted, indicating that the
determination is probably based upon the validity of the claim.88
TiE SECON'D STANDARD: DEFING THE CLASS
By DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT
The second requirement developed as an aid to the exercise of
the trial court's discretion is that the class must be defined by the
conduct of the party opposing the class. It is the
I . . conduct complained of [which] is the benchmark for determin-
ing whether a subdivision (b) (2) class exists, making it uniquely
suited to civil rights actions in which the members of the class are
often incapable of specific enumeration.8 9
The concept generaly means that there must be some connection
between the group described and the purposes of the suit in pre-
venting harm to class members as a result of defendant's conduct.90
The class, then, will extend as far as defendant's conduct can be
expected to extend, regardless of its magnitude.9 1 However, where
the class is defined so broadly that it obviously encompasses in-
dividuals who have no standing to sue in connection with the claim
being litigated, the definition is inadequate.92 Or, where the facts
failed to show that defendant's discriminatory conduct extends be-
88. Compare Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (W.D.
Tenn. 1971), with Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207 (D.S.C. 1973),
and Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
89. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972). The requirement
is derived from the wording of Rule 23 (b) (2):
[T]he party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class ....
90. MooRE, 1 23.04 at 20 (Supp. 1974).
91. E.g., Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899 (E.D. Penn. 1970) (all citizens
of Philadelphia); Connell v. Higginbotham, 305 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. Fla.
1969), affd in part reversed in part, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (all persons seeking
employment with any state agency). Such broad class definitions would
be unusual in 23 (b) (3) actions because of the notice requirement, and the
problem of calculating damages. See Note, Manageability of Notice and
Damage Calculations in Consumer Class Actions, 70 MIcH. L. REV. 338
(1971).
92. WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760 at 582. See also Kister v. Ohio Board of
Regents, 365 F. Supp. 27 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp.
431 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D.
515 (N.D. Old. 1970).
yond the named plaintiff,93 or the named family, 4 then the class,
as alleged in the complaint, simply fails to exist.
Those courts which emphasize this requirement, over the re-
quirement of definitiveness, have taken a pragmatic approach to
the question concerning the adequacy of the class definition. 5 A
pragmatic approach is one which deals primarily with the effect of
the conduct complained of, as opposed to the identifiability of the
class members.98 It is merely an extension of the policy that,
"[w]here federally protected rights have been invaded ... courts
will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief."97  As expressed in Yaffe v. Powers,08 the pragmatic ap-
proach gives the trial judge a special responsibility to ask himself,
unless a claim is "patently frivolous:" 99
[A]ssuming there are important rights at stake, what is the most
sensible approach to the class determination issue which can enable
the litigation to go forward with maximum effectiveness from the
viewpoint of judicial administration?' 00
However, in defining the class by defendant's conduct it is diffi-
cult for a court to determine the adequacy of the initial class defi-
nition. Lack of information, lack of time, inartfully drawn com-
plaints, and the simplicity involved in merely refusing to certify
the class action, have made it rather difficult to determine exactly
what defendant's conduct entailed, and what the effects were.10 1
Furthermore, any trial lawyer knows that "asservation and fact
are sometimes complete strangers.'10 2 Recognizing these problems,
the Yaffe court stated that:
[S]ince a Rule 23(b) (2) class is defined by the actions which
a defendant has taken toward the class, and which should arguably
be enjoined, it may appear sensible to ascertain the nature of the
93. Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1972).
94. Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1970).
95. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (Ist Cir. 1972); Wecht v.
Marsteller, 363 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Penn. 1973).
96. The trial court, in Yaffe v. Powers, was criticized for its "... specu-
lation as to the status of the members of the putative class rather than
its focusing on the effect of the conduct complained of." 454 F.2d at 1366.
97. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
98. 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972).
99. "Patently frivolous" probably means, "[S]o explicitly foreclosed by
previous decisions as to leave no room for real controversy." Leonard v.
Vicksburg & C. R.R. Co., 198 U.S. 416, 422 (1904); Goosby v. Osser, 409
U.S. 512, 518 (1972).
100. 454 F.2d at 1367.
101. Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C.
IND. AND COM. L. REv., 527, 529 (1969).
102. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 46 F.R.D. 56, 60 (S.D. Ga.
1969).
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actions taken with more precision than reference to pleadings and
affidavits permit.103
For these reasons most courts have been sympathetic to a request
for some limited form of discovery, with leave to amend the defi-
nition if necessary, prior to a determination as to the adequacy of
the class definition. 0 4 Where, however, there is a request for a
preliminary hearing on the issue there is a distinct split of author-
ity. Some courts feel that an evidentiary hearing and discovery
"may be essential,"' 0 5 while others may order an evidentiary hear-
ing only where there is an initial "minimal showing of substance"
to the class action claims. 0 6 A number of courts have refused to
allow a preliminary evidentiary hearing as a denial of the right to
a jury trial,'07 or as merely serving to make the Rule 23 determina-
tion "too cumbersome."' 0 8 All courts have been careful to point
out that any preliminary hearing is not a hearing on the merits of
the case.' °9
The effect of allowing limited discovery and an evidentiary hear-
ing seem to be helpful in the exercise of the trial judge's discre-
tion.110 Recognizing the value in ascertaining the factual circum-
stances, some courts have simply refused to make a determination
until there are sufficient facts exposed through discovery."' Other
courts have approached the question by issuing a conditional order
defining a "tentative class" until all the evidence is in, which
seems to be the best approach if the main concern is in structuring
a viable decree, as opposed to concerns with notice, the scope of
discovery, or questions involving satisfaction of Rule 23 (a).112
103. 454 F.2d at 1367.
104. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Alabama, 485 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1973).
See also WRIGHT & MILLER, § 1785 at 131.
105. 485 F.2d at 713.
106. Rossin v. Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir. 1973).
107. Vernon J. Rochler & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 P.R.D. 335,
348 (D. Minn. 1971).
108. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
109. Miller v. Mackery International, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427-28 (5th Cir.
1971).
110. See Tolbert v. Western Electric Co., 56 F.R.D. 108, 113 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (Discovery showed that no class existed); Welmaker v. W.T. Grant
Co., 365 F. Supp. 531, 551-552 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (Discovery showed existence
of a class).
111. E.g., Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 887, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
112. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 192 (E.D. La. 1968),
terminated in part and affirmed in part, 321 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971);
Once the factual circumstances are ascertained, the Yaffe ap-
proach requires the trial judge to take an even more active role.
The court should re-define the class if necessary, 118 or divide it into
subclasses, 114 or fashion relief with the vague class definition in
mind,1 5 or even infer the bounds of the class where plaintiff fails
to delineate them.110 In short,
... the Court under F.R. Civ. P. 23 has the duty, and ample powers,
both in conduct of the trial and relief granted to treat common
things in common and distinguish the distinguishable."17
If a mistake has been made the court can subsequently re-define
the class, or even dismiss the class action."18
However, for two reasons a strictly pragmatic approach, like the
"strict" standard of definitiveness, has its disadvantages. First, it
is unacceptable if the court decides that additional procedures
must be complied with, such as discretionary notice under Rule
23(d), or there are questions as to satisfaction of Rule 23(a).119
Second, a strictly pragmatic approach would defeat one of the pur-
Butcher v. Rizzo, 317 F. Supp. 899, 904 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
113. E.g., Kister v. Ohio Board of Regents, 365 F. Supp. 27 (S.D. Ohio
1973); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
114. E.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 54
F.R.D. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
115. E.g., Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp.
1187 (D. Md.), modified and afl'd, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
116. E.g., Saddler v. Winstead, 332 F. Supp. 130, 136 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
117. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968). Courts
seem to look favorably upon an initial class definition which is as broad
as the evidence may conceivably prove the class to be, subject to being
narrowed after the evidence is in. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49
F.R.D. 184, 192 (E.D. La. 1968), terminated in part and aff'd in part, 321
F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1971). However, courts seem adverse toward
broadening the definition at trial, even though it is recognized that the con-
duct extends beyond the class as previously defined. Sabala v. Western
Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (Refused to broaden
class definition because trial preparation was based upon a limited class
definition). Nevertheless, if new evidence at trial appears to show that
important constitutional rights will be jeopardized by a narrow decree, most
courts would probably broaden the class definition. See Hairston v. Hutz-
ler, 334 F. Supp. 251 (W.D. Penn. 1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 621 (3rd Cir. 1972).
118. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 46 F.R.D. 56, 60 (S.D. Ga.
1969).
119. See, e.g., Wecht v. Marsteller, 363 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Penn. 1973),
where the class was defined as "... . all persons who now, have in the past,
or will in the future, travel upon the public roads, sidewalks and highways
of the City of Pittsburg." It would be impossible for plaintiffs to give no-
tice to class members. Even if notice by publication were sufficient, see
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), it would
be impracticable since the class could conceivably include all human beings.
The same problem would arise under Rule 23 (e), if the parties wished to
settle the controversy out of court, and where the numerosity requirement
of Rule 23 (a) (2) was in question. See text accompanying note 22, supra.
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poses for developing the two main requirements; to provide uni-
form standards by which to measure the adequacy of a 23(b) (2)
class definition.12 0 Like the minimum standard of definitive-
ness, 21 the best approach, then, would be one approximating a mid-
dle ground.122 It should consider application of Rule 23(b) (2) op-
timistically, and seize upon the opportunity to adjudicate important
constitutional rights. Yet, procedural requirements should not be
compromised, nor should uniform standards by which to exercise
discretion be ignored.
CONCLUSION
The requirements explored in this article are by no means the
only guidelines by which a court will exercise its discretion in de-
termining the adequacy of a 23(b) (2) class definition. Varying
factors are present in each factual circumstance presented to a
court. Availability of alternative remedies, the apparent validity
of plaintiffs' claim, and public policy play a substantial role in the
trial judge's exercise of discretion. 23 Even in light of the gener-
ally recognized rule that a court may not deny class status in a
23(b) (2) action merely because there is no need for it, 12 4 it is sus-
pected that some courts use this basis for a determination. 2 5 Those
courts tend merely to confuse the issues and establish precedents
which can be used for further abuse of discretion. Thus, if there
is to be uniformity of decisions, when faced with similar factual
circumstances, the existence of an adequately defined class must
stand or fall on its own.
However, in requiring an adequate class definition, courts should
not prescribe that which is unnecessary, or unreasonable in light
of the unique nature of civil rights class actions under.23 (b) (2).
One concern with O'Shea v. Littleton is the Court's apparent en-
dorsement of the Lopez-Tijerina approach to the standard of de-
120. 454 F.2d at 1367.
121. See cases cited note 68, supra, and text accompanying note 70, supra.
122. See, e.g., Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184 (E.D. La.
1968).
123. See, e.g., American Servicemen's Union v. MVitchell, 54 F.R.D. 14 (D.
D.C. 1972).
124. Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th Cir. 1972).
125. See, e.g., Rumler v. Board of Sch. Tr. for Lexington Co. Dist. No.
1, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971).
finitiveness. If this analysis is correct it can have a wide range of
effects on the area of civil rights, as the Lopez-Tijerina case well
illustrates. Perhaps it is an inadvertent carry-over from the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent tendency to limit application of Rule
23(b) (3). Whether it be inadvertent or deliberate, if the present
Court does to Rule 23(b) (2) what it has done to Rule 23(b) (3),
it may well jeopardize the constitutional rights of all-as one
class.
A suggested approach for a trial judge would be the following
procedure: (1) Determine what reasons there are, in the particu-
lar controversy, for requiring a class definition. Is it a 23 (b) (2)
action? Will discretionary notice be required? Will the parties re-
quire extensive discovery? Are there questions involving satisfac-
tion of Rule 23 (a), such as whether the numerosity requirement
has obviously been satisfied? What problems can be expected in
issuing a viable decree? (2) Determine what standard of defini-
tiveness is required in light of the answers to the previous ques-
tions; (3) Apply the Yaffe approach 126 to the question, and take
an active role in ascertaining the factual circumstances and con-
structing a definition which, (a) satisfies the minimum standard
of definitiveness, and (b) which will be defined by the conduct of
the defendant. The trial judge should bear in mind that, "...
the actual definition of the class remains the prerogative of the
Court, for which any allegation of plaintiffs as to the scope of the
class serves only as 'raw material'."'1 2 7
JAN GoLDsmirh
126. See text accompanying note 100, supra.
127. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 196 (E.D. La. 1968).
"The class asserted by plaintiffs should serve as the starting point for the
definitive fixing of the class by the court under Rule 23(c) (1)." Id. at
196 n.1.
